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Introduction
The integration of countries into the world economy is often regarded as an important determinant of differences in income and growth across countries. Economic theory has identified the well-known channels through which trade can have an effect on growth. More specifically, trade is believed to promote the efficient allocation of resources, allow a country to realize economies of scale and scope, facilitate the diffusion of knowledge, foster technological progress, and encourage competition both in domestic and international markets that leads to an optimization of the production processes and to the development of new products.
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In particular for less-developed countries, trade patterns and changes in those patterns over time are closely associated with the transfer of technology. Also, openness to trade introduces the possibility of an international product cycle, as the production of certain products previously produced by advanced economies migrates to less-developed countries. This process of "product migration" is accompanied by an increase in the trade volumes of lessdeveloped countries and a diffusion of more advanced production technologies, which expands the technology available to less-advanced countries.
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The effect of trade policy on income and growth is more controversial. 3 On the one hand, lowering trade barriers is likely to foster international trade by reducing transaction costs, which in turn can enhance economic growth rates. Likewise, it can be argued that developing countries or emerging market economies that are more open to the rest of the world have a greater ability to absorb technologies developed in more advanced nations. On the other hand, it has been argued that some forms of protectionism, e.g., infant industry protection to develop certain industries or sectors or a strategic trade policy in key sectors, can be beneficial for economic development.
Not surprisingly, the empirical literature has analyzed both the impact of trade policies and trade volume on economic growth extensively. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) Similar to the impact of trade policy on growth rates, the empirical evidence for the trade volume is ambiguous too, as the methodologies used as well as the robustness of the results have been challenged (Rodríguez and Rodrik 2001, Rodríguez 2007) . As a measure of the trade volume, the overwhelming majority of papers use the trade ratio, that is, exports plus imports as a share of GDP. As the dependent variables, these studies use either economic growth rates or income levels.
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In this paper, we will re-examine the impact of the trade volume on economic growth rates.
While we discuss (and test) various indicators for trade in empirical growth regressions, one particular indicator emerges as our preferred choice both from a theoretical as well as an empirical point of view: the volume of exports and imports as a share of lagged total GDP.
This trade measure avoids a potential bias due to simultaneous changes of both the nominator, volume of exports and imports, and the denominator, total GDP. What is more, a causal and statistically robust link between trade and growth can be established for this indicator. The findings hold true for the sub-sample of developing countries too. introduces the country sample and discusses various possibilities of specifying trade in our empirical model, Section 4 presents the empirical findings for both the total sample and the sub-sample of developing countries. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Model and Econometric Specification
Starting point of many analyses of differences in growth rates of output per worker across countries is the textbook Solow (1956) model or its augmented version as used, e.g., by Mankiw et al. (1992) . In the augmented version of the Solow model, growth, measured as the difference between the logarithm of output per worker in period t and its initial value ( − ), is determined by the level of technology ( ), the rate of technological progress (g), the initial output per worker ( ), the saving rate ( ), the share of capital/ human capital in output ( )/ ( ), the rate of convergence to the steady state ( ), the depreciation rate ( ), the growth rate of the labor force ( ) and investment in human capital ( ):
To explain differences in output across countries it is necessary to make further assumptions about how technology develops in each country. Mankiw et al. (1992) assume that the level of technology at any given point in time depends on every country's initial level of technology ( ) while the growth rate of technology is constant across all countries:
However, with respect to developing countries, the assumption of a constant uniform growth rate of technology seems inadequate. In the words of Solow:
5 "Nearly everyone takes it for granted that the rate of growth of TFP is the same everywhere.
The only thing that justifies this remarkable presumption is the fairly mechanical thought that knowledge of new technology diffuses rapidly around the world. Maybe so, but productivity performance depends on many other influences besides the content of the latest engineering textbook" (Solow 2007, p. 10) .
It can be argued that the diffusion of internationally available technology depends on countryspecific factors. International trade in goods and services is a principal channel for the international exchange of ideas. For that reason, we believe that trade is a crucial countryspecific determinant of the differences in the diffusion of technology. To accommodate the impact of trade a different assumption about a country-specific development of the technology level, , has to be made:
" # in general captures the determinants of the development of technology, like trade, that differ across countries (Gundlach, 2005) . Inserting this assumption into the augmented Solow model (1) yields:
This model allows for a combination of the properties of the augmented Solow model with more realistic assumptions about a country-specific development of the technology level.
The theoretical model (4) yields clear implications for the specification of a testable regression equation:
+% # " #, + + + , + -6 or equivalently:
+% # " #, + + + , + -
The model includes period-specific intercepts (+ ), accounting for period-specific effects like changes in productivity affecting all countries, country-specific fixed-effects (, ) and an independent and identically distributed error term (-).
Estimating the above model, however, is plagued by some well-known difficulties. The explanatory variables are potentially endogenous and measured with error. Some important variables, e.g., the initial level of technology and other country-specific effects, are not observable and omitted in the estimation. Estimating this dynamic panel data model by ordinary least squares (OLS) or within group estimations will potentially lead to biased results. To solve this problem, we have to follow an instrumental variable approach, that is, to find adequate instruments that are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but are not correlated with our dependent variable. As it is difficult to think of appropriate external instruments, Bond et al. (2001) recommend the System GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to solve the difficulties of empirical growth regressions. The System GMM estimator does not require any external instruments but uses lagged levels and differences between two periods as instruments for current values of the endogenous explanatory variables. The procedure simultaneously estimates a system of equations that consists of both first-differences as well as levels of the estimation equation.
Taking first differences eliminates country-specific fixed-effects and solves the problem of the potential omission of the initial level of technology and other time invariant countryspecific factors influencing growth. This approach ensures that we can concentrate on the impact of the explanatory variables on income per capita growth and not vice versa.
Data and Sample
The panel dataset used in this study consists of up to 108 countries (of which 87 are developing countries) covering the period 1971-2005 (1970-2005 for the GDP per capita variable). 6 Unfortunately, data is not available for all countries for the first periods resulting in a slightly unbalanced panel. To reduce the impact of business cycles we use a total of seven five-year averages for all variables, 1971-1975, 1976-1980 In our model, we include the control variables of the core Solow model following the specification of Mankiw et al. (1992) . The saving rate ( ) is approximated by the investment share of real GDP per capita in current prices (InvestmentShare). For the growth rate of the labor force (n), we use the average population growth rate which is the difference between the logarithm of total population at the beginning and the end of the period. As in Mankiw et al. (1992) , the growth rate of the world technology frontier (g) and the depreciation rate ( ) are assumed to be constant across countries. The term ln( + + ) is calculated as the logarithm of the population growth rate and 0.05 p.a. ( + ) as a constant (PopulationGrowth). Investment in human capital ( ) is approximated by educational attainment, more precisely the average years of secondary schooling in the total population over age 15 (Education). Finally, we include the initial level of GDP per capita
There is no unique indication in which manner trade should enter growth estimations. A commonly used measure in the analyses of the relationship between trade and growth is total trade volume (of both goods and services) as a share of total GDP (TradeShare). The trade-to-GDP ratio is often referred to as the "trade openness ratio". The term does not necessarily 6 See Appendix A for data sources and Appendix D for a list of countries included. Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B and C. 7 The results are not sensitive to alternatively using the difference between the first and the last year of the current period. The Solow model suggests using GDP per worker instead of GDP per capita which might be important if dependency ratios vary across countries. Mankiw et al. (1992) use per worker data while other authors, e.g., Caselli et al. (1996) and Islam (1995) , use per capita data. Hoeffler (2002) has found that results are not sensitive to either choice.
imply low tariffs or low non-tariff barriers but simply measures how much of a country's GDP is traded. In a dynamic panel setting, we argue that the trade-to-GDP ratio is not suitable to measure correlation or causality between trade and growth. If trade in general has a positive impact on growth in the sense that increasing trade (volumes) does increase GDP through the channels described above, the "trade openness ratio" fails to adequately capture this effect over time. Depending on the elasticity of trade on GDP, increasing the trade volume might increase GDP in a proportionately larger, smaller or exactly equal way. Consequently, the "trade openness ratio" can either increase, decrease or stay the same due to an increase in trade and its corresponding changes in GDP. A positive impact of trade on GDP can lead to a decrease in the "trade openness ratio" as an increase of the numerator might be offset by a larger increase of the denominator.
We propose a solution to that problem by using lagged values of total GDP for the "trade 
Empirical Results
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn to the empirical results. As a benchmark, we first focus on the augmented Solow model that explains differences in GDP per capita growth across countries and time with the initial level of GDP per capita, the investment rate, population growth and human capital. The first three columns of Table 1 The investment rate as a share of GDP (InvestmentShare) has a positive and highly significant coefficient. Increases in population growth (PopulationGrowth) have a significantly negative effect on GDP per capita growth rates and the influence of investment in human capital (Education) is positive and significant at the conventional 10 per cent level.
8 Education data is collected every 5 years by Barro and Lee (2010) . We include the educational attainment at the start of each period, e.g., the observation of 1970 for the period 1971-1975 in the estimation equation and subsequently treat that variable as predetermined. This has been done in a similar form by Hoeffler (2002) . A different possibility would be to take the average of two consequent observations and treat the education variable as either predetermined or endogenous. Our results are not sensitive to either choice.
The Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions confirms the joint validity of our instruments. The p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for second-order correlation in differences (Ar(2) Test) rejects first-order serial correlation in levels. The difference-in-Hansen tests confirm for all variables the individual validity of the instruments. In the System GMM regression of column 3, all realizations of the potentially endogenous explanatory variables lagged by two periods and more have been included as instruments. In the case of the education variable, the realization lagged by one period serves as an additional valid instrument. As we use lagged levels and lagged differences, the number of instruments can be quite large. Yet too many instruments can overfit the model and also weaken the power of the Sargan/ Hansen test. 9 Thus, we reduce the size of the instrument matrix by restricting the number of lags used. In the next step, we therefore replicate the estimation reducing the number of instruments. In column 4 only the first available instrument has been employed. In columns 1-3 the total number of instruments is below the number of countries. However, the extensive lagstructure limits the possibility of adding further endogenous explanatory variables that require additional instruments and easily increases their number to a critical amount. 10 We are able to replicate the basic findings of previous works, e.g., Bond et al. (2001) and Hoeffler (2002) .
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Having established a valid benchmark, we subsequently include our main variable of interest:
trade. The first candidate is the widely used TradeShare variable (column 5), which is the total trade volume divided by total GDP of the same period. Including that additional variable does not fundamentally alter the results of the benchmark regression but the coefficient of the trade variable is negative and not significant. As argued above, we do not believe that this
TradeShare variable adequately captures the impact of trade on GDP per capita growth.
Including our preferred measure of that influence, TradeShare (GDP t-1), fundamentally changes the regression results for the impact of trade on GDP per capita growth (column 6). Employing alternative trade measures confirms the significant influence of trade on GDP per capita growth.
TradeShare (GDP t-1)
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Next, we examine whether both channels of how trade influences GDP per capita growthvia the absolute volume of trade (or alternatively the volume divided by total GDP or population) and its growth rate -can be substantiated even if they occur simultaneously. Finally, in column 4 both TradeGrowth and TradePop are included which yields significant results for both variables. The results of Table 2 once more confirm the adequateness and robustness of our TradeShare (GDP t-1) variable. In addition, we show that both channels, trade and the expansion of trade, have an independent impact on GDP per capita growth.
It is obvious to ask if our results for total trade hold true for imports and exports independently as well. Table 3 
Conclusion
An increased integration of countries into the world economy through trade is seen as a fundamental cause of differences in income and growth across countries. The aim of this paper is to establish a causal linkage between trade and GDP per capita growth. To reach that aim several specifications of trade in empirical growth estimations are discussed. In a dynamic panel setting, it is argued that the often used trade-to-GDP or "trade openness" ratio, which is the volume of exports and imports as a share of total GDP does not adequately capture the impact of trade on GDP per capita growth. Assuming a causal linkage between trade and income, changes in trade (volume) over time would always cause corresponding changes in income. This dynamic effect is not accounted for by the "trade openness ratio".
Due to changes in the numerator, trade volume, and the associated changes in the denominator, GDP, the "trade openness ratio" can either increase, decrease or stay the same.
Building on these considerations, a different trade variable is preferred: the volume of exports and imports as a share of lagged total GDP. This trade measure avoids a potential bias when both volume of exports and imports and total GDP change simultaneously.
Using the alternative trade measure in combination with the valid instrumentation of the System GMM estimator allows establishing a causal relation between trade and differences in GDP per capita growth. Trade does indeed have a positive and significant impact on growth.
We find evidence that the expansion of trade, e.g., through its associated access to additional technologies, has a significant impact on income growth as well. In addition, it can be shown that both channels, trade and the expansion of trade, have an independent influence on GDP per capita growth. The same results hold true for both exports and imports separately.
The positive influence of trade on income growth is also confirmed for a sample of developing countries only. Trade has been found to be effective in fostering economic growth in developing countries. These findings are crucial for the current discourse in the "development community" as they underpin the importance of trade related development aid, for example, the Aid for Trade initiative. 
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